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BOOK REVIEW
The Continuing Presidential Dilemma
By Stephen Hess. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976. Pp. ix, 218. $10.95.
ORGANIZING THE PRESIDENCY.

Reviewed by Thomas Blau*
He vetoed minor bills that he did not like, impounded appropriated funds that
he did not need, ignored restrictive amendments that he found unconstitutional and improvised executive action for bills that would not pass.'

The words are extremely familiar-that they belong to an aide
of John Kennedy and describe his Presidency may be less so. The
problems of the Presidency are not new. The transformation has
occurred in the evaluation of such behavior and especially in the
concept of the proper balance between the Presidency and Congress.
Changing personalities in office may account for much of the evolution of the institutional critiques.
Organizing the Presidency-much to Stephen Hess's
credit-does not participate in the simplistic version of this dialectic. Despite having served on the staffs of two Presidents, he calls
for a drastic diminution in the power of the White House staff in
favor of its rival, the Cabinet. An effective Presidency, in his view,
requires a more nearly collegial administration in which Cabinet
officers constitute the principal sources of advice and are personally
accountable to the President for the operation of their segments of
the government.2 Reviewing the evolution of the modern Presidency,
Hess argues that the size of the staff is not the cause of the presidential malaise, but rather is an effect. Employing misleading analogies
to corporate management, "Americans-and their Presidents-have inflated the rhetoric of the presidential job description."3 As Wildavsky and Knott cogently argued in their review of
President Carter's "philosophy" of zero-based budgeting, these
analogies are invalidated by the government's production of politi* Assistant Professor of Political Science and Social Science, University of Colorado (on
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cal goods for which accounting methods are unlikely to be invented.4
"Yet the White House staff is not a sufficient fulcrum to move the
weight of the federal establishment. It can never be large enough to
do the job." 5 The President, according to Hess, needs colleagues in
the Cabinet rather than personal assistants in the White House
staff.
Hess thus supports the appointment of strong individuals to the
Cabinet and the effective transformation of the White House staff
into a Cabinet secretariat. Although his proposal suggests that
"Cabinet members should be the primary spokesmen for the Administration" and that "[t]he Cabinet must become the focal
point of the White House machinery," 6 his final suggestion admits
that "[a]bove all, the President must want the Cabinet to be an
effective instrument of advice."' If he wanted it, he would have it.
If he had it, but did not want it, its impact would be minimal
without a major constitutional overhaul.
Utilizing an interesting and perceptive historical review, Hess
develops and argues his case well. Nevertheless, reaction to his proposal probably will be highly individual, because views of the Presidency continue to be unsettled - especially since we recently have
seen the modest beginnings of Article H evolve into the high adventure of the constitutional theories of H.R. Haldeman and others. 8 In
the final analysis, most views will reflect feelings toward incumbents.
President Carter presents a challenge. He is the outsider from
Plains who seeks new solutions in a new style, who responds to other
outsiders, who acts comprehensively, and who sometimes seems
sudden to traditionalists. This, however, may result in less accessibility to others holding positions of responsibility. "Power to the
people" can serve as a vehicle for reducing the power of their representatives. The urge toward the heroic Presidency was not limited
to Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy: it also characterizes Jimmy
Carter. The demands imposed on the President make the alternatives almost impossible. Even under President Ford, the power of
the White House did not diminish. Not only the President but also
4.
(1977).
5.
6.
7.

Knott & Wildavsky, Jimmy Carter's Theory of Governing, 1 WOODROW WILSON Q. 2

HESs, supra note 2, at 153.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 216.
8. H. SEIDMAN, POLITICS, PosITIoN, AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATION
76-79 (1975).

19771

BOOK REVIEW

the polity in general contributes to the increase in politicalization
of formerly nonpublic issues. Congress responds to the scope, complexity, and electoral danger of these politicized issues by delegating
excessive discretionary power to the Executive and others (such as
local governments). In conjunction with his role as party leader, the
President is under great pressure to maximize the power of the staff
that is immediately accessible and personally responsive to him.
Despite the possibility that Presidents themselves may agree
with much of Hess's analysis, they are likely to resist reliance on the
Cabinet for advice, especially in the corporate form favored by Hess.
The role of a Cabinet member involves more than advice and administrative execution. Sometimes it includes legitimate, if substantively irrelevant, symbolism, as the search for a black woman
demonstrated. Charles Kirbo, for example, would not be more useful as Secretary of State; nor does the Secretary of Commerce have
a major advisory role.
Theodore Lowi has written that "in the. presidency there is
great power to commit but very little to guide." ' Whether the collegial Cabinet addresses this problem is doubtful. The source of
nonguidance lies in legislation that tends to identify object areas
and does not specify problems, actions to be taken, and standards
of evaluation. Such a system greatly increases the likelihood of phenomena such as OSHA and ERISA. Any study of the Presidency,
including a work as intelligent as this one, would profit by addressing the role of the legislative process and the inability of the polity
to engender debate about the proper and effective role of government as well as its limits. Without legislation at least partially
informed by such debate, the Presidency must remain an office
whose great power is exceeded by the demands placed on it, thus
making the mildest of incumbents "imperial" by necessity.
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